The Metaphysics of PunishmentAn Exercise in Futility

WILLIAM K.S. WANG"
If I were having a philosophical talk with the man I was
going to have hanged (or electrocuted) I should say, I don't doubt
that your act was inevitable for you but to make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common good.
You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if
you like. But the law must keep its promises....
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, in HoLmEs-LAsI LETTERS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF Mu. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HARoLD J. LAsKi,

1916-1935, at 806 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
INTRODUCTION
This Article is written from a utilitarian point of view. In other

words, I assume that the ultimate goal of society is to achieve the
greatest total human happiness.' The thesis of this Article is that
the criminal law is hopelessly arbitrary.
It is relatively easy to establish the arbitrariness of the criminal
process as it actually exists in America. Most entering law students
* B.A., Amherst College, 1967; J.D., Yale Law School, 1971. Mr. Wang
is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of San Diego, and is
currently a visiting Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis.
1. See A. EWING, ETHICS 35-36 (1953). In the calculation of total happiness, increases in happiness are offset by both decreases in happiness and
increases in unhappiness.
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have naive and unclear notions about the workings of the so-called
system of criminal justice in the United States. They are surprised to learn that the pressures of congested court calendars and
strained police resources have forced both the judiciary and the
prosecution to penalize defendants for pleading not guilty and re-

ward them for pleading guilty. 2 Not surprisingly, almost 90 percent
of accused individuals plead guilty after a bargaining session with

the prosecutor.3

The system has come to operate as an expedient

and well-oiled "ministry of justice," with few of the trappings that
most laymen associate with due process.
The more one studies the criminal process as it actually functions,
the more he becomes convinced that the system is chaotic and ar-

bitrary throughout-from the discretionary arrest by the police officer 4 to the haphazard sentence imposed by a judge 5 to the granting
2. It is proper for the court to grant charge and sentence concessions to defendants who enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
when the interest of the public in the effective administration of
criminal justice would thereby be served. Advisory Committee on
the Criminal Trial of the ABA Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty 36 (Approved Draft, 1968).
For general discussion of the plea-bargaining system, see Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66
YALE L.J. 204 (1956). The case of Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264,
276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1969), contains an argument that, due to the possibility
of not being convicted, the reduced sentence given the defendant who pleads
guilty roughly equals the expected sentence of the defendant who pleads
not guilty. See also Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1970).
3. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMmNATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIL 3 (1966). The percentage of criminal defendants pleading
guilty has risen rapidly in recent years. Between the years of 1956 and
1962, only 79% of criminal defendants in federal courts pleaded guilty or
nolo contendere. Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964). See generally Note, The Role of Plea Negotiation in Modern CriminalLaw, 46 CHI.KENT L. REV. 116 (1969). For a bibliography of articles and books on plea
bargaining, see D. ToMPKINs, SENTENCING THE OFENDER-A BIBLIOGRAPHY
26-31 (1971).
4. See generally K. DAVIs, DISCRETONAnY JusTICE: A PRELUVNAnY INQUIRY 84-96 (1969); J. SKOLNICI,

JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL:

LAW ENFORCE-

MENT IN DEMOCRATIc SOCIETY 204-45 (1966); Goldstein, Police DiscretionNot
to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
5. See M. FRANEL, CaRiINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973);
Harries & Lura, The Geography of Justice: Sentencing Variations in U.S.
JudicialDistricts, 57 JUDICATURE 392 (1974).

or rescission of parole by a quasi-judicial board.6 It is relatively
simple, however, to criticize the existing law enforcement system.
This paper has a more ambitious goal It attacks the very philosophical foundation of the criminal process by demonstrating the
impossibility of devising any system of criminal justice which is not
hopelessly arbitrary.
TRADITIONAL JusTICATIoNs OF PUNISHMENT

The Six Commonly Advanced Reasons for Punishment
There are six reasons generally advanced to explain why society
imposes penalties on law breakers: retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence and moralizing.
Retribution
Retribution, traditionally one of the most important goals of punishment, 7 has two possible forms--revenge and expiation of moral
guilt.8 Revenge gives pleasure to those seeking to punish the criminal.9 Expiation of moral guilt is a benefit to the criminal, whose
moral guilt is supposedly purged through the suffering produced
by punishment. 10 Under some definitions of "moral guilt," the "expiation" and the "revenge" views of retribution might lead to different results.
To illustrate, suppose individual A throws a bomb into a crowd,
and the explosion kills some people and injures others. Individual
B throws a bomb into another crowd under virtually identical circumstances, but, through no virtue of B's, the bomb is a dud. There
are many who believe that individuals A and B are equally morally
evil and should be punished identically." If both remain unrepent6. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRIONARY JUSTICE: A PREnmnnmutY IN126-33 (1969); Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YA L.J. 810 (1975).
7. See, e.g., I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 195-97 (W. Hastie transl.
1887). For a recent judicial discussion of the legitimacy of retribution as
a goal of the criminal system, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
QUmY

8.

See H.L.

PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 37-39

(1968).
9. Id. See also Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
1497, 1511-14 (1974).
10. H.L. PACKER, THE LIMTS OF =HECanxINAL SANCTION 37-39 (1968).
11. For example, the Model Penal Code provides that attempts to commit
crimes (other than felonies of the first degree) are to be punished to the
same extent a9 completed crimes. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (1) (Proposed

Official Draft 1962).
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Several states have adopted this view also. Schul-
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ant, their souls would receive the same treatment at the hands of
God. Under a theory of pure revenge, however, B's punishment
would probably be much less severe than A's. Society's desire for
revenge is unlikely to be as great when no harm has been caused.
Even if A were a raving lunatic, he might still -bepunished under
a pure revenge theory of retribution, even though many might feel
that he was free from all moral guilt.
Some individuals who believe in an afterlife feel that man should
not take it upon himself to expiate moral guilt. This should be left
to God.1 2 Yet these individuals may or may not believe in revenge.
If they believe that man should turn the other cheek and be merciful, these ultra-religious people may find themselves in complete
opposition to retributive punishment by society.
It is often alleged that retribution depends on a belief in "free
wilL'' 3 If there is no "free will," it does seem impossible for "moral

guilt" to exist. But the "free will" debate does not necessarily have
any bearing on the "revenge"!aspect of retribution. 14 It is possible
for those who believe in "free will" to oppose retribution and even
for those who reject the notion of free will to believe in retribution.
The distinction between "revenge" and "expiation of moral guilt"
will be important when I later discuss the validity of retribution
as an objective of the criminal process.15
Incapacitation
A second possible reason for punishment is to physically restrain
the criminal, so as to make it impossible for him to commit further
crimes. This goal of the penal system is often called incapacitahofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of
Conduct in the CriminalLaw, 122 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1497, 1509 n.40 (1974).
12. See, e.g., John 8:7: "He that is without sin among you, let him first
cast a stone. ..."
13. R.GAmuER & B. RosEN, MORAL PmiLosopiHy: A SYsTAmTic INTRO ucTION TO NoR ATIVE ETifcs ANm METATHCS 185, 189-90 (1967). See R. GERBER & P. McAAN-Y, CoNTEMPoRARY PUNisHwENT: ViEws, EXPLANATIONS
AxD JusTmcATIoNs 39 (1972); H. O.PPENHEIER, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISH-

mT 226 (Patterson Smith Series in Criminology, Law Enforcement and
Social Problems No. 167, 1975).

14. Revenge, which is based on the pleasure created in others by the
punishment of an offender, is not affected by the culpability of the offender.
15. See text accompanying note 20 infra.

tion.16 In common-law England, virtually all felonies were punishable by death, a somewhat extreme example of incapacitation. 1"
Rehabilitation
Because most societies have moved away from drastic forms of
incapacitation like capital punishment or life imprisonment, another
important goal of punishment is rehabilitation. 1 8 Reluctant to incapacitate the offender indefinitely and equally unwilling to turn
him loose unreconstructed, society attempts to reform his character
so that he will no longer be inclined to commit crimes.
Specific Deterrence
While the emphasis of rehabilitation is on education and the healing powers of psychiatry, specific deterrence aims at making the
consequences of wrongdoing so unpleasant that the criminal will
become reluctant to risk engaging in illegal conduct again. Rehabilitation attempts to purge the criminal of any propensity to engage in criminal conduct; specific deterrence attempts to counter
his criminal inclinations by impressing him with the consequences
of getting caught. 19
General Deterrence
While specific deterrence is directed toward the person punished,
general deterrence attempts to discourage others from committing
similar wrongs by punishing one individual as an example. As with
specific deterrence, emphasis is placed on the unpleasantness of the
20
consequences of breaking the law.
Moralizing
It is also possible to view punishment as an expression of society's disapproval of certain behavior. Hopefully, the members of
16. The incapacitation justification presumes that the person physically
restrained has a high probability of committing crimes in the future. See
H.L.

PACKER, THIE IAMIS OF THE CnMUNAL SANCTION

48-53 (1968).

17. One estimate has put the number of capital crimes in England in 1889
as high as 223. J.A. McCAFFmTY, CAPITAL PuNisHmENT 8 (1972).
18. See generally S. RuBmr, H. "WtooFEN, G. EDWARDS & S. RosEmzwEa,
THE LAw OF CsnvnAL CoiREcTIoN 665-67, 671-72, 692-94 (1963); Allen,
Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CnvI. L.C.
& P.S. 226 (1959); Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 Hiuv.
L. Rv. 453 (1928).
19. J. ANDENAEs, PumsmiNT AND DETEmRRNcs 175-76 (1974).
20. Specific deterrence is usually more effective than general deterrence.
A criminal who has actually been punished is more likely to refrain from
criminal conduct than those who are merely threatened with punishment
if caught.
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society will internalize this disapprobation, and their moral inhibitions will be strengthened. If this effect exists, it might be called
the moralizing or educational function of punishment. 21
Both the "moralizing" and the "general deterrence" theories of
punishment focus on the general prevention of crime and the effect
of sanctions on persons other than the individual punished.
Retributive Punishment
Of all six justifications of punishment, by far the most controversial is retribution. Each side of the debate regards the position
22
of the other side as outrageous.
Expiation of Moral Guilt
As stated earlier, there are two different kinds of retributionrevenge and expiation of moral guilt. The existence of moral guilt
depends on the existence of "free will." A person cannot be morally condemned for behavior that is completely a result of forces
outside his control
Before it is possible to discuss whether "free will" exists, it is necessary to define it. Unfortunately, this is not an easy task. To find
a meaning for the term "free will," it is necessary to examine human decision-making and determine whether any factor in that
process could conceivably be labelled "free will."
Human decisions are made by changes in the brain, which is composed of matter. A person's mind can be thought of as a kind of
sealed chamber-with some entrances (the senses) but no exits.
What is contained in this chamber when a person is "born" or conceived is a result of heredity. What enters the chamber after
"birth" (or conception) is a result of environment. At any given
moment in time, what is contained in the chamber is entirely the
product of what was in the chamber to begin with (heredity) and
what has since entered the chamber (environment). Any decision
a person makes is completely determined by what is contained in
the sealed chamber.
21. See generally Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative,
Moralizing,and HabituativeEffects, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 550.
22. For a sample of this debate, see Armstrong, The Retributivist
Hits Back, 70 MA 471, 471-72 (1961).

Of course, an individual can decide to change his environment,
but the decision to do so would be entirely a result of what is already in the sealed chamber-which in turn is wholly determined
by heredity and previous environment. It seems impossible to escape from the fact that human behavior is completely determined
by heredity and environment and the interaction between the two.
If "free will" exists, it must be a factor other than heredity and
environment which influences decision-making. The following hypothetical exhausts all factors besides heredity and environment
which might affect human decisions.
Suppose there are two universes which have identical past histories and appear to be identical in every respect. Assume further
that in each of these universes there is a man standing next to a
cliff. The contents of the two men's minds are, at this point, identical. Nevertheless, individual A "jumps" off the cliff, while individual B remains stationary. From this point on, the two universes
will no longer be identical.
There are a number of conceivable explanations why individual
A "jumped" and B did not. The first possibility is that because of
some random occurrence within A's (or B's) mind, the contents of
their minds became no longer completely identical. Thus, two different decisions were made by two dissimilar minds. This might
be considered "random will," but certainly not "free will."
The second possibility might be called a "superatomic first
cause."28 If there were no atomic or subatomic "explanation" of
the phenomenon called "gravity," this phenomenon would be an example of a "superatomic first cause." Although bodies with mass
had -atendency to move toward each other as if there were a "gravitational force," there would be no such force in reality. If a child
asked; "why does a stick fall to the ground?," the answer "because
of a force called 'gravity"' would be both circular and extremely
misleading. Better answers might be; "the stick's falling is a first
cause," "I do not know why" or "there is no explanation." If two
bodies with mass were discovered which had no propensity to move
toward each other, similar explanations would be offered.
Individual A's "jumping" off the cliff might also be a "superatomic first cause." While this would signify defeat for the de23. A "first cause" is an event for which there is no causal explanation.

Thus, asking what causes a "first cause" would make no sense. Superatomic first causes are those that occur above the atomic level; subatomic
or atomic first causes are those that occur at the atomic level or below.
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terminist,24 the movement of A's body off the cliff would not involve any decision on his part and could not be considered an example of exercise of "will," much less "free will."
Many people might object that the best explanation to the child
of why a stick falls to the ground would be "it is God's will." Certainly, a third possible explanation of As "jumping" off the cliff
would be superatomic Divine Intervention. God might have
"moved" A off the cliff. Again, this would involve no "will" on
A's part.
Still another possibility would be an atomic or subatomic "first
cause.125 This might involve the spontaneous creation or destruction of particles within A's brain causing the contents of his mind
to become different from B's. This creation or destruction of matter would be a phenomenon of the same order as the original creation of matter in a given universe.
Since the spontaneous change within A's brain would have caused
A's mind to differ from B's, it is easy to understand why A would
make a different decision from that made by B. Because A's mind
actually decided to jump off the cliff, A's leaping might be considered an act of will; but it could not be considered "free will."
Closely related to the atomic or subatomic first cause explanation is the atomic or subatomic Divine Intervention hypothesis. The
change within A's mind could 'have been created by a direct act of
God. This change would have caused A to make a different decision
from that of B. Again, although A's action might be considered
willful, it could not be regarded as an -actof "free will."
This seems to exhaust the list of "conceivable explanations" of
A's jumping off the cliff and B's standing still. Yet not one of these
"causes" could be described as an exercise of "free will." Thus, it
seems impossible even to conceive of the concept of "free will." I
happen to feel, -however, that there are degrees of "inconceivability." It is therefore meaningful to discuss the degree to which "free
will" is conceivable.
24. Determinists believe that "all human actions (events performed by
human beings) are preceded by other events which are causally sufficient
for them." R. GARE &B. ROSEN, MORAL PmLosoPHY 189 (1967).
25. See note 23 supra.

If someone asked me if I could conceive of the relativity of time
or of a "circular" universe, I would reply that I could not conceive
of these things, but nevertheless entertained a belief in them due
to a rather simplistic faith in the utterances of Albert Einstein.
Although I cannot conceive of God, I nevertheless grant the possibility that He exists. It would be foolish for me to insist that
everything which I found inconceivable was impossible, since I find
equally inconceivable the beginning of a universe and a universe
with no beginning.
Yet it seems paradoxical for me to state that I could not conceive
of these things at all If I could not conceive of them, how could
I believe that they existed or possibly existed? Indeed, it would
seem that it would be necessary to have some understanding of
something before one could state that he found it "inconceivable."
Regardless of the solution of this paradox, "free will" appears to
me to be in an entirely different class of "conceivability." If someone asked me, "can you conceive of gluck will?," my response
would be "what was that you said?" If the person then repeated
"can you conceive of gluck will?," I might impolitely reply, "what
-areyou babbling about?"
Perhaps it would be useful to distinguish between "inconceivability" and "nonsensicality," the latter term being reserved for concepts totally devoid of meaning. I think that the term "free will"
might come under ,thelatter classification.
"Moral guilt" is said to be dependent on "free will."2

I think

that both these terms should be permanently discarded into the
refuse heap of nonsensical concepts. The theory that society should
"expiate moral guilt" should similarly be discarded.
Revenge
As stated 'at the beginning of this paper, another kind of retribution is punishment for revenge. Many contemporary philosophers
regard this reason for punishment as cruel and inhumane. 27 The
misdeed has already been committed. To persecute the wrongdoer
'accomplishes nothing and is merely sadistic.
On the other hand, some philosophers maintain that the desire
for retributive revenge is a widespread and deep-seated emotional
26. See authorities cited note 13 supra.
27. See, e.g., T. HoNDEIcH, PuNIsmvin : THE SUPPOSED JUSTMICATxONS

30 (1969); K.

MIENNiNGER,

THE HumvA

MIND 448 (1945).

Cf. Coddington,

Problems of Punishment, in TaEoRIEs or PUNIsmENT 333, 341 (S. Grupp
ed. 1971).
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drive which should be gratified. It is difficult to evaluate this argument unless one assumes that the ultimate goal of society is to maximize human welfare, i.e., to achieve the greatest total human happiness. The pro-revenge view can then be understood as concluding
that the satisfaction which the general public derives from witnessing the punishment of wrongdoers outweighs the suffering which
the punished must endure.
It is difficult to understand how one could ever verify this hypothesis. Economists have long been stymied by the so-called "interpersonal comparison" problem: "A and B are better off; C is
worse off. Is total welfare increased or decreased?" Some economists question whether one individual's happiness is even comparable to another's. 28 If happiness is not homogeneous, then the concepts "total welfare" and "maxmzization of total welfare" become
meaningless.
Nevertheless, in order to fomulate any sort of social policy it
is necessary to suppress the "interpersonal comparison problem"
and make some judgment as to whether it is desirable to punish
for the purpose of revenge. Even if one disregards the "interpersonal comparison" problem, however, it is still extremely difficult
to determine whether or not total happiness is increased or decreased by punishing a few for the satisfaction of the many.
An argument similar to that in favor of retribution can be made
for any sort of persecution which is justified solely because it gratifies the majority. Racial and religious oppression, as well as genocide, immediately come to mind. 29 The arguments for and against
persecution involve extremely difficult philosophical issues.30 If
28. P. SAmuVmsoN, FoUNDATioNs OF ECONIioIVc ANALYSis 205-06 (College
ed. 1965).

See M. DoBB,WELFARE ECONOMICS AND

=

EcoNoMIcs oF SocIAL-

ism 80-82 (1969). For a general discussion of the "interpersonal comparison
problem," see Goodin, How to Determine Who Should Get What, 85 ETmcs

310, 311-14 (1975).

29. Indeed, in certain situations, a very strong utilitarian argument can
be made for genocide. If the majority race is already persecuting the minority and the races detest and fear each other, a quick and efficient implementation of a policy of genocide may gratify the majority race and put
the minority race out of its misery. ("Premature" death is always ambiguous because it is difficult to determine whether on balance the individual
would have been happy or unhappy for the rest of his life.) Once the minority race has been exterminated, there will be no more racial oppression
and tension.
30. At some points in the discussion of moral guilt and revenge, this Ar-

one decides it is impossible to measure whether or not a certain kind
of persecution will increase human welfare, the debate over retributive revenge can only be conducted on a level of moral exhortation.
Individuals reared in one society may approve of both genocide
and retribution for revenge. Those brought up in another society
may strongly disapprove of both these practices and may not see
much difference between the average Nazi and the average American who believes in retribution. Oddly enough, Americans do not
find it inconsistent to advocate retributive punishment and simultaneously condemn genocide with great self-righteousness. Perhaps Americans would be opposed to punishment for retributive
purposes if they came to appreciate the similarities between retributive revenge and other forms of persecution.31
ticle may appear to come perilously close to nihilism. However, all discussion in this paper is based on the unquestioned premise that the ultimate
goal of society is to maximize "human welfare," broadly defined. It would
certainly be beyond the scope of this article to question the value of "human
welfare" or of human existence.
31. Another problem with revenge as a justification for punishment is
that in many types of crimes the individual lawbreaker does not do any
harm at all. For example, the citizen who cheats the government of tax
revenues is guilty of tax evasion or fraud, but the loss of a few hundred
dollars in revenues has literally no effect on the operations of the government or the level of prices in the nation.
Because of the desire to justify punishment on the basis of retribution,
most people insist that there is some negligible effect caused by minor tax
evasion. In reality, however, this fallacious reasoning il the result of incorrectly assuming that what is true of the whole is, on that account alone,
true of each individual part of the whole. Most members of society consider it their moral or patriotic duty to vote. However, if they were rational, each individual would realize that his individual vote is useless. No
national or state election has ever been carried by one vote. If an election
were ever carried by one vote, there probably would have to be another
election, since the ballot-counting process is not accurate to one vote. While
it is true that dire consequences would ensue if no one voted, this in no
way affects the desirability of one person's voting.
Similarly, if the Internal Revenue Service instituted an honor system for
smaller taxpayers, it would be irrational for each of these taxpayers to assume that not paying his taxes would cause any harm.
This analysis is simply an extension of the economic theory of perfect
competition. See generally A. ALcHuIr & W. ALLEN, Uiqvsrry EcoNo mcs
111-113 (3d ed. 1972); J. HENDERSON & R. QUA=DT, MIcRoEcoxoMIc THEoRy
104-05 (2d ed. 1971); R. LEFTwIcH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOcATiox 23-24 (3d ed. 1966); E. MANSFIELD, MIcROEcONOMICS 100-01, 223-25
(1970); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 43, 68-70, 482 (9th ed. 1973); Robinson,
"What is Perfect Competition?," 49 QUARTERLY J. Ecoxr. 104 (1934).
Even those individuals who resist these conclusions, however, will have
difficulty with the arrest and conviction of an automobile driver who carefully looks both ways at an intersection, sees that the street is completely
deserted, and crosses against a red light. The action is completely harmless
and yet is punished.
Thus, in at least some instances, retribution is not a goal of punishment.
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NonretributivePunishment
As already mentioned, in addition to retribution, there are five
other possible functions of the criminal process; incapacitation, rehabilitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence and moralizing.
All these justifications of punishment have the ultimate aim of reducing the level of crime rather than of satisfying the sadistic urges

of the general population.
Although these five theoretical goals 'of punishment seem worthwhile, it is not easy to determine the penal system's success in
achieving them. In an article entitled "The Purposes of Criminal
Punishment," Gerald Gardiner describes the deportation of the
Danish police by the Germans in 1944 and the consequence of de-

priving Denmark of a police force:
The result was that there was a considerable increase in offences against property, but, significantly, no comparable increase
either in murder or sexual crimes. This appears to confirm other
evidence that greater certainty of detection and of punishment
does deter many potential offenders, but that where strong passions or deep psychological motives are involved, the prospect of
detection and punishment have relatively little effect.32
Although the Danish experience during the Nazi occupation is en-

lightening, it is impossible to know whether the same results would
The nonretributive goals of the criminal law are discussed in the following
section.
For similar examples (used by supporters and critics of utilitarianism)
see R. GARNEa & B. RIOSEN, MoaAL PHILosoPHy 70 (1967) (tax evasion);
H.J. MCCLOsKEY, 1MzrA-ETnics AD NomVrATivE ETmcs 182 (1969) (lying,
cheating and breaking promises); Ewing, What Would Happen if Everyone
Acted Like Me, 28 Alum 16, 17-24 (1953) (lying, tax evasion, not enlisting
during wartime and not voting); Harrison, Utilitarianism,Universalization,
and Our Duty to Be Just, in ETmIcs 76, 78 (J. Thompson & G. Dworkin
eds. 1968) (walking on the grass and not voting); Singer, Generalization
in Ethics, 64 Ium 361, 365-66 (1955) (failure to vote, avoiding military
service during wartime and lying); Smart, Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, in ETmIcs, supra 136, 146 (secretly watering one's garden in violation
of an edict designed to conserve water); Stout, But Suppose Everyone Did
the Same, 32 AUsTmALTAN J. Pmi. 1, 4, 16-17 (1954) (promise-keeping, tax
evasion, failing to vote and frivolously using water or power during a shortage); Strang, What if Everyone Did That, in ETHICs, supra 151, 151-52, 156
(income tax evasion, not voting, and not volunteering for the armed service
in a time of crisis); Sullivan, Rules, Fairnessand Formal Justice, 85 ETIcs
322, 324-25 (1975) (walking on the grass).
32. Gardiner, The Purposes of Criminal Punishment, 21 MoD. L. Rsv. 117,
124-25 (1958).

occur in the United States or even in Denmark today. Furthermore, the continued presence of a system of successfully enforced
criminal law may inculcate a habitual respect for the law which
takes some time to wear off. If there were no police force in a country for an entire generation, the incidence of nonproperty crimes
might increase.
It is virtually impossible for society to conduct controlled experiments to test the effect of punishment. While it is easy to recognize
the incapacitative effect of the penal system, it is quite difficult
to test the exact rehabilitative and special deterrent effects and virtually impossible to determine the general deterrent and moralizing
effects.
Since the same act of punishment theoretically serves to lower
recidivism in two different ways (rehabilitation and specific deterrence) and to lower the general level of crime by another two
means (general deterrence and moralizing), it is difficult to separate one effect from the other. For example, American penal systens have generally been increasing their attempts to rehabilitate
criminals, with the result that parole and probation are more liberally granted and many minimum-security prisons are much more
pleasant. 3 3 Although this may increase the probability that criminals will be rehabilitated, it may decrease the general and specific
deterrence effect of a prison sentence.
Not only is it difficult to determine whether the penal system is
effective in achieving its various goals, it is also virtually impossible
to run a nonretributive criminal process which is not incredibly arbitrary. Perhaps it would be best for me to demonstrate this point
through the use of an allegory.

AN

ENLIGHTENED UTILITARIAN NoNREiBUTIVa SYSTEM

OF PUNISvIBENT

Once upon a time there was an enlightened nobleman who
gained absolute control of a small country and proclaimed himself
the philosopher-king. One of the goals which this king set for himself was to set up a rational and just system of criminal punishment.
The new monarch was a kind man who disapproved of the harsh
and brutal rule of the former king. Under the old regime the sole
33. For a discussion of the history and development of the prison system

of the United States, see W. HARTmNGEu, E. ELDEFONSO & A. CoFFEY, CoRREcTioNs: A CorwPoNENT oF T= CRImNAL JusTIcE SYsTEm 80-99 (1973).
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goal of punishment was retribution. The previous king set punishments which he felt were appropriate for the wickedness of the
criminal act. Torture, disfigurement, execution, and imprisonment
were liberally utilized.
One of the first acts of the new king was to abolish the government agency in charge of this retributive punishment. Expiation
of guilt was declared to be a meaningless goal, and punishment for
revenge was rejected as cruel and inhumane. The philosopher-king
then set out plans for five new agencies with the power to punish
or incarcerate individuals-the Departments of Incapacitation, Rehabilitation, Specific Deterrence, General Deterrence, and Moralizing.
The Department of Incapacitation was given the duty of anticipating when people were about to commit crimes, arresting these dangerous individuals, and rendering them incapable of committing
the crime. This department, the first to be organized, quickly decided on the policy of executing every individual with a strong propensity to break the law. Other government officials objected,
however, and the philosopher-king not only vetoed this policy but
abolished the entire department. 34 The Departments of Incapacitation, Rehabilitation, and Specific Deterrence were merged into one
superdepartment called the Department of Special Prevention of
Crime (also referred to as the Special Department). For the sake
of symmetry, the Department of General Deterrence and Moralizing were combined to form the Department of General Prevention
of Crime.
The Department of Special Prevention assumed the responsibility
of determining when people were about to commit crimes, arresting
and incarcerating these individuals, and attempting to convert them
into law-abiding citizens.
34. Obviously, those favoring rehabilitative punishment would object.
But even those who accept deterrence as the prime function of criminal
punishnient might reject the death penalty on utilitarian grounds. Several
empirical studies fail to show that the death penalty produces any increase
in deterrent effect over long-term imprisonment. See Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 353-54 n.124 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); H. BEDAU, The
Question of Deterrence, in THE DEATa PENALTY IN AmssCA 258-332 (H.

Bedau ed. 1964). If these studies are valid, a utilitarian would reject the
death penalty because it inflicts greater harm on the criminal than other
forms of punishment without any counterbalancing benefit.

Since the king rejected the goal of retribution, there was no reason to distinguish between those who had actually committed
crimes and those who had a high propensity for breaking the law, 0
except insofar as actual criminal conduct indicated a willingness to
again violate the law. Often, however, if an individual committed
a crime and was not apprehended, the probability of his recommitting a crime became incredibly great. At this point, the Special Department would arrest this socially dangerous individual-not because he had committed a crime but because he was so likely to
commit another crime. On the other hand, if an individual broke
the law but was no more likely than the average member of the
population to again engage in the illegal conduct, he would not be
bothered by the Special Department.
Since such a large number of psychiatrists and psychologists were
employed in the Special Department, its "prisons" were much like
schools and hospitals and very unlike the torture chambers of the
old regime. Some of the king's advisers complained about the mildness of the punishment meted out by the Department of Special
Prevention. The officials of the Special Department responded by
arguing that the unpleasantness suffered by a prisoner must be considered a cost to society and that when this factor was considered,
rehabilitation was more "efficient" than harsh punishment.
Unable to evaluate the validity of this argument, the king turned
to his trusted adviser, the Wise Sage, who, after consulting the
movements of the stars, decided that rehabilitation was indeed more
efficient than brutal punishment. (In any case, the director of the
Department of Special Punishment was his brother-in-law.)
35. The pure utilitarian would accept incarceration or other punishment
of an individual if the social benefit gained thereby outweighed the social

harm. The societal gain of decreased crime includes avoidance of harm
to victims (and indirect harm to their families), decreased fear of crime
in the community, and avoidance of outrage at the very fact that a crime
is committed. The outrage factor is most easily identifiable in the case of
victimless crimes, like pornography and homosexuality, but is present to
some degree with all crimes. Even if they do not know the victim, for
example, most members of society are upset by robbery because of the unjust enrichment of the robber and impoverishment of the victim.
Included in the calculation of social detriment would be the cost of operating the detention system, the loss of income and unhappiness of the individual incarcerated, the grief of his friends and family, and the happiness
the incarcerated individual would have enjoyed if free (including, from a
strict utilitarian point of view, the enjoyment of committing crimes).
For an economic analysis of the costs and benefits of enforcing the laws
against murder, see Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
A Question of Life and Death, 65 Am. EcoNoMIc Rv. 397, 402-05 (1975).
For a utilitarian analysis of the costs and benefits of punishment generally,
see Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoLTIrCAL EcoNomy 169 (1968).
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Although the Department of Special Prevention prevailed over
its critics in this debate, the agency was soon wracked by internal
dissension. There was acrimonious disagreement as to exactly how
great a criminal propensity was required before an arrest was justified. A similar controversy raged over the extent of "cure" required before a prisoner could be released.
The philosopher-king decided to intervene lest the efficiency of
the department be impaired. A special advisory commission was
appointed to investigate the matter. Unfortunately, the advisory
commission concluded that the problem was insoluble. First of all,
the commission reported that the psychiatrists could not evaluate
with any degree of accuracy the propensity of individuals to commit
crimes. Second, it decided that since the harm to the person punished must be balanced against the resulting social benefit, the
minimum "probability of committing a crime" necessary for arrest
and the minimum probability necessary for continued incarceration
should vary with the harmfulness of the potential crime.3 6 The
commission, however, felt completely unqualified to evaluate the
relative harmfulness of antisocial acts.
The entire problem was again turned over to the Wise Sage, who
was growing increasingly fond of astrology. After requesting a
complete list of crimes, the Sage studied the heavens and assigned
minimum probability figures for arrest and for continued incarceration to each kind of criminal conduct. A royal decree established
these-figures as the official guidelines of the Special Department.
It was not long before two more attacks on the Special Department were instituted. The first attack came from the same prodeterrent officials who earlier criticized the overemphasis on rehabilitation in the agency. These critics now advocated that minimum
detention periods be set for each crime so that the sentences would
be of unpleasant length even if they could not be of unpleasant
character. The Special Department responded by arguing that its
discretion to release prisoners was already constrained by the requi36. For example, an individual with a 40% or greater probability of committing shoplifting might be arrested and incarcerated until his probability
of committing that crime decreased below 30%. On the other hand, an
individual with a 20% or greater chance of committing robbery might be
arrested and incarcerated until his probability of committing that crime
decreased below 10%.

site minimum probability figures set by the Wise Sage. In evaluating the probability that an individual would commit a crime, the
agency would take into consideration both the rehabilitative and
the specific deterrent effects of the punishment which the prisoner
had received. A minimum sentence would lead to arbitrary and
unequal treatment of prisoners, since one prisoner might be released while another individual with the same propensity to commit
crime might remain in prison because he had not finished his minimum sentence.
After consulting with the Sage (who supported his brother-inlaw), the king upheld the Special Department.
A second attack on the Department by another group was more
successful. This second group of critics advocated a maximum sentence for each crime. They quoted the earlier statements of the
Special Department that the unpleasantness suffered by a prisoner
must be considered an important social cost. If a prisoner were obdurate, he might never be released.
The philosopher-king was impressed with this argument and
asked the Sage to calculate a formula which would decrease the extent of "cure" necessary for release as the length of detention increased. The Wise Sage chose a simple rate of increase of five percent per annum in the minimum probability figure required for
37
continued imprisonment.

Despite the activities of the Department of Special Prevention,
there was still a fair amount of crime in the Kingdom. This was
due partly to the inefficiency of the Department and partially to
the commission of illegal acts by those low-risk individuals which
the Department had no power to arrest or continue to detain. Responsibility for further decreasing the Kingdom's general level of
crime was placed with the Department of General Prevention of
Crime, which consisted of two divisions-the Office of General Deterrence (O.G.D.) and the Office of Moralizing.
In pursuing its goal of discouraging lawbreaking, the Office of
General Deterrence was given considerable discretion in making ex37. For example, if in the first year of detention an individual would only
be released if his probability of committing shoplifting was less than 30%;
during his second year of incarceration, he would be released if his probability of committing shoplifting was less than 31.5% (30% plus .05 x 30%);
during his third year of imprisonment he would be released if his probability for committing that crime was less than 33.075% (30% x 1.052); etc.
The Sage could have argued that in making his prior calculations he had
already considered the possibility that some individuals might remain incarcerated indefinitely and that he should therefore be allowed to revise upwards slightly the previous minimum probability figures necessary for continued detention.
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amples of violators. This office promptly converted itself into a
top-secret agency and began to stage sham trials and punishments
which the population at large believed were real. The agency pretended to catch and execute large numbers of criminals each month.
It was hoped that individuals contemplating a crime would be suitably impressed with the efficiency of the state's criminal detection
process and the dire consequences of engaging in illegal conduct.
Unfortunately, the people of the kingdom became suspicious of
this deception. It was then decided to abandon sham punishment.
Instead the O.G.D. would secretly pick individuals at random from
the general population, frame them, and inflict actual punishment.38

Since no one in the agency believed in "moral guilt" or

retribution, they were just as willing to punish an innocent person
as a guilty one. There was no reluctance to frame individuals who
had committed no crime.
Of course, the Office of General Deterrence was immediately
confronted with the serious problem of deciding the length and
character of prison terms for each crime and choosing the number
of individuals per month to punish for a given crime. The O.G.D.
found it virtually impossible to balance the social benefits and costs
of its activities, largely because of the difficulty of measuring the
general deterrent effect of its punishment and the cost of punishing an innocent individual. It is not easy to decide whether society
should execute one human being to prevent five or ten other murders from being committed, but it is even more difficult to decide
whether it is worth punishing an innocent individual to somewhat
decrease the level of embezzling. 39

38. See generally E. PiNcoFFs, THE RATIONALE Or LEGAL PUNISBHMET 3337 (1966).
John Rawls argues that a general policy of framing the innocent is nonutilitarian because of the possible abuse of discretion by the officials in

charge of the framing program. Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PnnosoPcAL REV. 3, 10-14 (1955). On the other hand, H.J. McCloskey has questioned Rawls' conclusion and suggested that under certain circumstances
framing the innocent can be justified on utilitarian grounds. McCloskey,
An Examinationof Restricted Utilitarianism,in CONTE PORARY UTTARIANism 127-28 (M. Bayles ed. 1968).
39. The difficulty of determining the deterrent effect of punishment has
been discussed at pp. 317-18 supra. Even if it were possible to precisely determine the amount of crime deterred by punishing an innocent individual,
the calculation of the net social benefit gained thereby would involve
weighing the immeasurable factors discussed in note 35 supra.

As usual the Wise Sage was requested to "solve" the problem.
After a period of intense observation of the heavens, the Sage determined for each kind of criminal conduct the "optimal" combinations
of the crucial variables-number of individuals per month to be
framed, length of punishment, and character of punishment.
The new policy of framing individuals worked fairly smoothly.
Secret agents of the O.G.D. would study the habits and activities
of the person to be framed, plant incriminating evidence among his
possessions, and make thorough preparations for the frameup. Often the work of the O.G.D. agents would be so effective that the
accused himself came to believe that he committed the crime while
insane and would plead insanity as a defense.
Oddly enough, although no one in the Office of General Deterrence believed in retribution, the insanity defense was still theoretically allowed at "trial." The officials of the O.G.D. hoped to create
among the socially dangerous the sense of being part of a group
of sane criminals. If most criminals came to identify themselves
with this group, then it would seem to them that a larger proportion of their group was being apprehended and punished. 40
Since the O.G.D. secretly controlled the proceedings of the trials,
they practically never allowed the insanity defense to succeed and
nearly always chose relatively normal individuals for framing.
Once in a while to keep alive the myth of the insanity defense, the
division would frame a truly insane individual, allow the defense
to prevail, and have the fellow committed.
The only classes of individuals other than the insane who were
exempt from framing were employees of the O.G.D. itself. It was
not long, however, before this policy of random selection came under criticism. Some royal advisers felt that the Office of General
Deterrence should grant exemptions to college students, doctors,
teachers, and other valuable members of society. 41 Other advisors
40. To illustrate, suppose there were one hundred murders in a given

month, but it appeared that half of these were probably committed by
sociopathic or insane individuals (who were unapprehended). If the fifty
other murders identified themselves as sane and if the O.G.D. framed and
convicted thirty so-called "sane" murderers, it would seem to the sane
group that sixty percent of their number had been punished. (The insane
group might notice that none of their number had been caught, but all the
members of this group are presumably nondeterrable anyway.) On the
other hand, if the insanity defense were not even allowed in theory, it
would appear to potential lawbreakers that only thirty percent of a homogeneous group called "murderers" had been apprehended. For an excellent general discussion of insanity defense problems and proposed solutions,
see G. MORRIS, THE INSAmTY DEFENSE: A

BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE REFOIV

(1975) (justifications for the defense discussed at 1-8).
41. Arguably, social welfare would be increased if only the less pro-

ductive members of society were framed and incarcerated.
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felt that the Office should make an attempt to discover which
members of the population would find the punishment most bearable. Poor, unemployed individuals would presumably suffer less
than members of the upper class. Alienated and disaffected members of society might also be preferred candidates for framing because they are already fairly unhappy. Such individuals might also
have a tendency to be subversive.
Some egalitarian critics of these proposals argued that the poor
and disaffected were already disproportionately represented in the
populations of the prisons maintained by the Department of Special
Deterrence. If there should be any discrimination, it should be towards punishing the rich, so that the burden of being punished
could be spread more evenly.
The philosopher-king had some difficulty understanding why
egalitarianism should be applied to the area of punishment. After
all, every previous decision by these agencies had been based on a
comparison of social costs and social benefits, and it would seem
sensible to attempt to minimize the social cost of punishment.
The Wise Sage, however, was rather weary of gazing at the stars
and recommended that the random selection process be continued,
except for exemptions to the insane, to high government officials,
and to all employees of the Office of General Deterrence. The Sage
also warned that he would refuse to aid in setting any further exemption guidelines. After some deliberation, the king accepted the
Sage's advice.
Before long, another controversy arose over a new proposal called
the dice-system of sentencing. All the sentences previously recommended by the Sage to the O.G.D. 42 would be decreased, but after
a (framed) defendant had been convicted of a certain crime, the
judge would throw two dice. If the dice totalled seven or eleven,
the defendant's sentence would be doubled. Since criminals were
a superstitious lot, they would overvalue the probability that they
would receive a double sentence. Thus, the same deterrent effect
could be obtained with less punishment.
Opponents of this proposal advanced a number of arguments.
First, they questioned the extent of the so-called "superstitiousness
42. See p. 324 supra.

of criminals." Second, potential lawbreakers might assume that
they would have good luck with the dice. Finally, the critics argued that the people of the Kingdom would be offended at the arbitrariness of such a system.
Supporters of the dice-system restated their former arguments;
and in response to their opponents' third contention, they pointed
out that the United States Supreme Court was very concerned with
"equal protection" but had virtually never attempted to eliminate
the randomness of sentencing within the American judicial system.43 Furthermore, randomness of punishment also pervaded the
substantive criminal law in the United States. For example, many,
if not most, American jurisdictions punish attempted crimes less
seriously than completed crimes, although, ignoring retribution for
44
revenge, there is no reason to distinguish the two.

The critics of the dice-system attacked the latter argument by
pointing out that the Americans believed in retribution. The dicesystem supporters responded by quoting opinions of the United
States Supreme Court which omitted retribution from a list of the
goals of punishment.

45

To prevent internal dissension from impeding the efficiency of
the Office of General Deterrence, the king forcefully halted the entire debate by rejecting the dice-system by royal fiat. After this
decree, the debate subsided.
The Moralizing Division of the Department of General Prevention
of Crime was a great deal less active and less controversial than
43. See Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to
Mempa to McGautha, 49 TExAS L. Rnv. 25, 44-45 (1970); Note, Equal Protection Applied to Sentencing, 58 IowA L. REv. 596 (1973).

But cf. Furman

v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See generally Dorszynski v. United States,
418 U.S. 424, 440-42 (1974); M. FRANKE, CRmNAL SENTENcEs--LAw WITOUT ORDE 75-85 (1973); Harries & Lura, The Geography of Justice: Sentencing Variations in U.S. Judicial Districts, 57 JUDICATURE 392 (1974);
Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to the
Concept of Appellate Review 53 NEB. L. REv. 463 (1974); Zumwalt, The
Anarchy of Sentencing in the Federal Courts, 57 JUDICATURE 96 (1973).
44. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1498
(1974). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05, app. A (Tentative Draft No. 10
1960); 'W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRimiNAL LAw 452-53 (1972);

Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model
Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, Part Two, 61 CoLUm. L. REV. 957, 1022-24 (1961).
45. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343-45 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111-13 (1957) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n.5 (1952);
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949).
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the General Deterrence Division. Since the activities of all the
other punishment agencies probably had some sort of moralizing effect, the Moralizing Division voluntarily yielded up its power to incarcerate and punish people and contented itself with influencing
the curriculum of the school system and with public relations campaigns urging citizens to obey the law.
The various punishment agencies of the government were functioning relatively smoothly when it suddenly occurred to the king
that the Departments of Special Prevention and General Prevention might cooperate with each other. The Office of General Deterrence could secretly frame individuals that the Special Prevention Department had already decided to incarcerate. This would
kill two birds with one stone, so to speak. Furthermore, the Office
of General Deterrence would no longer need to pick its candidates
for framing at random. If the total supply of antisocial individuals
from the Special Department was insufficient for the O.G.D. to
meet its quotas, the Special Department could be requested to lower
its minimum probability figures and supply more names. Not only
would the kingdom be relieved of the burden of running two prison
systems, but there would be a drastic reduction in the number of
individuals that the state would be forced to punish.
Despite these obvious advantages, the Department of Special Prevention put up tremendous opposition to the proposal. First of all,
the psychiatrists and psychologists in the Department felt that the
arrest, frame-up, and conviction would be such a traumatic and
embittering experience for most people that they could never be
rehabilitated. Secondly, the O.G.D.'s prisons were rather unpleasant and placed practically no emphasis on rehabilitation. Finally,
the sentences imposed by the courts of the O.G.D. were sometimes
longer than the periods of detention which would have been imposed by the Special Department. (Of course, they were also sometimes shorter.)
Nevertheless, the king refused to change his mind. The sentences
of the O.G.D. courts were now converted into minimum periods of
incarceration. However, the king did make one concession. Only
the first half of the new, minimum court sentence would be spent
in O.G.D. prisons (which were made somewhat more pleasant). The
second half of the minimum detention period plus the rest of the

total imprisonment period would be spent in Special Department

prisons. (Prisoners would not be released until their criminal propensities were below the minimum probability figures for continued
detention previously recommended to the Special Department by
the Wise Sage. 46)
Because a great many of the people declared dangerous by the
Special Department were sociopathic or insane, the O.G.D. was
forced to reevaluate its position on the insanity defense. The
agency was tempted to simply quash the defense whenever it was
raised by the accused, but this would be so blatantly unjust in most
cases that society's respect for the O.G.D. judicial system might be
undermined.
On the other hand, if a greater number of individuals successfully
pleaded the defense and then were civilly committed, sane criminals
might be tempted to believe that they also could get away with the
defense.
The king submitted the matter to the Sage who decided that it
would be simpler if the insanity defense were eliminated. The king
readily agreed, especially since the insanity defense had always
47
been inconsistent with the royal policy condemning retribution.
Since some of the individuals referred to the O.G.D. by the Special Department had only attracted the latter agency's attention after engaging in illegal conduct, the O.G.D. would often decide to
"frame" such persons for the crime they had actually committed.
It was only in situations like these that the kingdom ever resembled
the criminal process in a system of retributive punishment.
RETRIBUTmON As A CONSIDATmON

In the mythical kingdom just described, the ruler condemned retribution as cruel and inhumane. What if the monarch had taken
a less rigid attitude toward retributive punishment?
The Wise Sage might have been ordered to take into consideration the retributive feelings of the populace when determining for
each kind of criminal conduct his directions to the O.G.D.-number
of individuals per month to be framed, length of punishment, and
character of punishment. For example, if a large number of the
king's subjects would be displeased for retributive reasons with
46. See p. 321 supra.
47. Unless retribution is a goal of punishment, moral guilt is irrelevant
except to the extent that punishment of the guilty produces greater social
benefit (at the same or less cost) than punishing the innocent. See note
35 supra.
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only a twenty-five-year prison sentence for kidnapping, the Sage
would tend to lengthen the sentence. On the other hand, if other

members of society thought (because of retributive considerations)
that twenty-five years was too harsh a sentence for kidnapping, the
Sage would weigh the feelings of those who wanted a stiffer sentence against those who wanted a lighter sentence. These factors
would then be considered along with all the other social costs and
benefits of punishment in order to arrive at the final official guidelines for the Office of General Deterrence.
TBE ImPossiB naTY OF REFORM
Most political systems are not run by an enlightened philosopherking, but the dilemmas faced by the ruler of the mythical kingdom
must be confronted by anyone who wishes to devise a nonretributive, utilitarian system of criminal law. The many problems referred to the Astrologer-Sage must be solved arbitrarily.
Once retribution is abandoned as a goal of punishment, there is
no longer any reason to distinguish between persons who have in
fact committed crimes and those who merely have a propensity to
do so. In order to maximize social welfare, the harm to the person
punished must be balanced against the social benefit produced by
punishment. Regardless of which of the possible nonretributive
goals of punishment is accepted, a schedule must be adopted matching punishment with crimes and/or propensities to commit crimes.
Absent omniscience, it is impossible to draft a nonarbitrary schedule.
Furthermore, it is impossible to know how to improve the present
system, since it is impossible to know the relationship between the
results of our current system and the results of the system which
would be adopted by an omniscient punisher. One arbitrary factor
in the present system may well be offsetting another arbitrary factor. For this reason it is impossible to tell whether or not any
change in the system will be beneficial. The following analogy
illustrates this principle.
Suppose there exists a magic box with a large number of vertical
grooves in its bottom surface. Each of the grooves contains a marble which was once set at a specific spot. As long as the marbles
were in these exact positions, fortune would smile on the entire

country. Furthermore, the further the marbles were moved from
their original positions, the worse conditions will be for the residents of the land. Unfortunately, the box has been vigorously
shaken hundreds of times so that none of the marbles are in their
original positions. Assuming that no one knows where the marbles
were originally, it would be impossible to tell if moving the marbles
would be beneficial or harmful.
A more legal illustration would be the determination of damages
in tort suits. Many of the factors which the jury must consider in
deciding awards require clairvoyance (e.g., compensation for future
loss of income) or omniscience (e.g., compensation for pain and suffering). 48 It is unlikely that the amount awarded by the jury
would even be close to the amount which an omniscient person
would grant. Assume the judge mistakenly instructs the jury that
the injured party is not entitled to compensation for hospital expenses-an incredibly blatant error. 49 Is there any point in retrying the case? If the jury had a tendency to undercompensate, the
error increased the unfairness of the award; but if the jury had
a propensity toward overcompensation, the error led to a more equitable decision. Since new trials are an expense to society and legal
fees are exorbitant, a strong argument can be made for letting the
case stand.
Those who run a law enforcement system must make a large
number of fantastically difficult decisions. Obviously, the decisions
made by confused human officials will deviate from those which
would be made by an omniscient and just god. Unfortunately,
there is no way of knowing anything about the extent and quality
of the deviations. Thus, there is no way of learning how to improve
the system. Piecemeal reforms are futile, because one arbitrary aspect of the system may be cancelling out another.
An omniscient god might be able to devise and operate a system
of criminal law which was not hopelessly arbitrary. Mere mortals
would be foolish to even attempt to duplicate such a feat.

48. See generally D. DoBBs, REmEnDiEs § 8.1 (1973).
49. Id. at 543.

